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SPRING 1993 
The New Constitutional Courts: Albania 
THE TRIBUNAL IN TIRANA 
By John Paul jones 
As amended periodically, The Law on Major Constitu-
tional Provisions of April29, 1991 (No. 7491) serves the 
Republic of Albania as a temporary constitution. The 
final constitution, which is currently being prepared by 
the Special Constitutional Commission, must be ratified 
by the People's Assembly to take effect. When the Law 
on Major Constitutional Provisions was enacted more 
than two years ago, it was intended by the People's As-
sembly to remain in force for less than a year. It is still in 
service, however, the Special Constitutional Commission 
having proven incapable thus far of drafting a suitable 
replacement. 
In its original form, the Law on Major Constitutional 
Provisions said little about an Albanian judiciary and noth-
ing about its role in constitutional enforcement. Article 2 
declared that the state was based on the rule of law and 
had the duty of respecting, inter alia, the constitutional 
order as well as human dignity, rights, freedoms, and 
equality under law. Article 3 identified the separation of 
legislative, executive, and judicial powers as the funda-
mental principle of state organization. Article 5 noted 
that judicial power would be exercised by courts that are 
independent and guided solely by law. While the organs 
and operations of legislative and executive powers were 
described in substantial detail, those of the judicial power 
were not described at all. Almost as an afterthought, 
Article 42left the establishment of courts to existing law. 
After the bloodless revolution of March 1992, a new 
People's Assembly moved to correct this oversight, pass-
ing some amendments and additions to the April 1991 
law, precisely one year later. Together, these April1992 
amendments added a new chapter to Albania's provi-
sional constitution entitled "The Organization of Justice 
and the Constitutional Court." Part I of the amendment 
established a judicial system comprised of a Court of Cas-
sation, an appellate court, courts of first instance, and 
military courts. Part II of the amendment established a 
Constitutional Court. Both the text and the structure of 
the amendment reveal the legislature's antipathy towards 
a unified judicial system of constitutional review. Explic-
itly described as the "highest judicial authority," the Court 
of Cassation enjoys appellate power to review for errors 
of law-except when the asserted error is lack of confor-
mity of a normative act with the provisional constitution. 
Errors of that sort lie within the exclusive purview of the 
Constitutional Court. According to Article 24, the Con-
stitutional Court has these competencies: 
1. It makes interpretations of the constitution and 
constitutional laws. 
2. It judges whether laws and acts that have the force 
oflaw are compatible with the constitution and with 
the law. 
3. It judges whether acts and regulatory provisions are 
compatible with the constitution and with the law. 
4. It decides on the compatibility with the constitu-
tion of international agreements concluded in the 
name of the Republic of Albania before their ratifica-
tion, as well as on the compliance of the laws with 
generally accepted norms of international law and 
with agreements to which the Republic of Albania is 
a party. 
5. It resolves disagreements of competency between 
the executive, legislative, and judicial powers as well 
as those between local authorities and the central 
power. 
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6. It decides questions connected with the constitu-
tionality of parties and other political and social orga-
nizations and can prohibit their activity. 
7. It resolves questions on the legality of the election 
of the President of the Republic, deputies, and also 
popular referenda, promulgating the conclusive re-
sults. 
8. It investigates penal accusations raised against the 
President of the Republic. 
9. It resolves conclusively complaints of persons pre-
sented by way of constitutional control for violation 
of their basic rights by illegal acts. 
10. It decides on the suspension of the implementa-
tion of a law when it observes that it is not compatible 
with the constitution, and on the suspension or repeal 
of acts and other provisions when it observes that 
they are not compatible with the constitution or with 
law, as well as taking measures that it deems appropri-
ate for the question it is adjudicating. 
According to Article 25, the court may itself initiate 
constitutional review. The President of the Republic, a 
parliamentary group, one fifth of the Deputies, the Coun-
cil of Ministers, judges and local government organs may 
also trigger review by the court, as may any person claim-
ing violation of his or her constitutional rights or free-
doms. 
According to Article 26, decisions of the Constitu-
tional Court must be reasoned. They must be reached by 
majority vote. Judges of the court acknowledge that there 
have been disagreements about the resolution of one or 
more of the first eight cases, but no dissenting opinions 
have yet been made public. Despite the fact that Article 
26 specifically authorizes a dissentingjudge to attach to 
the court's decision a dissenting opinion, the Chief Judge 
has so far declined to release dissents for publication in 
the Official Notebook, which has been the exclusive 
source for decisions. As an example of the court's prod-
uct, Decision Number 8, the most recently reported, is 
described below. 
Albanian Constitutional Court Decision #8 
In Decision No. 8, the Tirana District Court and the 
Prosecutor General both challenged The Law on Weatr 
ons of May 25, 1992 (No. 7566). The law permitted 
police to enter residences and search for unlicensed fire-
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arms without prior authorization from the district pros-
ecutor, and directed that persons apprehended on suspi-
cion of possessing unlicensed firearms be held in custody 
for the duration of the investigation and trial. 
The Constitutional Court found that the Prosecutor 
General lacked standing to bring such a challenge, but 
found itself empowered to consider sua sponte the proposi-
tion that the Law on Weapons conflicted with Article 2 
of the Law on Major Constitutional Provisions as 
amended by Article 1 of the Law of April29, 1992. In 
other words, the Constitutional Court found itself com-
petent to consider on its own motion the proposition that 
a statute empowering police to search persons and places 
without the approval of the prosecutor violated the fun-
damental tenet of judicial independence and the funda-
mental right of persons to be free from arbitrary search 
and seizure. 
According to the Constitutional Court, searches with-
out prior prosecutorial authorization could be proper only 
in exceptional, that is urgent and flagrant, cases and only 
then if specifically provided for in the relevant penal stat-
ute. These limitations, along with the requirement that 
post hoc approval be obtained from the district prosecutor 
within twelve hours of the search, were deemed by the 
Court to be essential aspects of the freedom from unrea-
sonable search and seizure guaranteed by Article 2 of the 
provisional constitution. 
When the Court turned to the constitutionality of 
custodial detention of a suspect during the entire investi-
gation and trial, however, it applied the principle of judi-
cial autonomy articulated in Article 1 of the 1992 amend-
ment, rather than an individual right discernible in Ar-
ticle 2 of the Law on Major Constitutional Provisions. 
The court found that the decision to detain a suspect in 
custody was dependent on the particular circumstances 
of the case, including the type of offense, the weight of 
evidence, the health of the accused, as well as the likeli-
hood of flight, interference with the investigation, or con-
tinued wrongdoing. The analysis of such factors was a 
peculiarly judicial function, concluded the court, and its 
assignment to the police in cases governed by the Law on 
Weapons therefore constituted a breach of the constitu-
tional imperative of separation of powers. 
In light of the Albanian perception of the district 
prosecutor as a judicial officer, it is not clear why the 
Constitutional Court correlated the two issues and the 
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two principles in this fashion. Both issues may be seen as 
conflicts between executive power, as exercised by po-
lice, and judicial power, as exercised by judicial officers 
such as the district prosecutor and the trial judge. When 
police search without a prosecutor's approval, they usurp 
judicial prerogative just as much as when they detain a 
suspect in custody without a judge's approval. By the 
same token, if, in Albania, a person's constitutional rights 
include freedom from most warrantless searches, it is hard 
to imagine that they do not include as well freedom from 
confinement without the approval of a neutral and de-
tached magistrate. In Article 4 of its provisional constitu-
tion, the Republic of Albania guarantees individual hu-
man rights accepted by international conventions. Just 
such a right can be found in Article 9, Section 3 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
in Article 5, Section 3 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights. The Republic of Albania has pledged its 
conformity to both of these conventions. 
Having found two provisions of the Law on Weap-
ons incompatible with the Law on Major Constitutional 
Provisions, the Constitutional Court then proceeded to 
amend the former by judicial fiat. The court rewrote the 
first sentence of Article 14.4 of the Law on Weapons so 
that searches without prior prosecutorial approval would 
only be permitted in the limited conditions which the 
court had previously found constitutionally acceptable. 
The court merely declared the second sentence (permit-
ting detention untiljudgment) invalid. 
The Constitutional Court's twin holdings that 
Albania's provisional constitution prohibits both most 
warrantless searches and all pre-trial detention without a 
magistrate's approval ought to seem unexceptional to most 
Anglo-American observers. These holdings mesh with 
both our own constitutional traditions and an emerging 
Western consensus. On the other hand, the court's next 
step, rewriting a statute by court order, might raise an 
eyebrow or two, especially when it occurs so proximately 
to the court's reaffirmation of the sacrosanct nature of 
separation of powers. If, as this decision makes clear, the 
executive has no business makingjudicial decisions, what 
business has the court rewriting legislative acts? 
The offense is more formal than substantial, how-
ever. American courts accomplish much the same result; 
they just do it with less forthrightness. Tools for a voiding 
at least the appearance of conflict at the boundary be-
tween judicial and legislative power abound in systems 
based upon separation of powers. Perhaps the most illus-
trative example is the United States Supreme Court's 
revision of the draft law for conscientious objectors in 
United States v. Seegar. The Selective Service and Training 
Act of 1940 had excused from compulsory military ser-
vice those who by "religious training and belief" opposed 
all wars. When a new draft law was enacted in 1948, 
Congress narrowed the religious training and belief pre-
requisite to conscientious objection to "belief in relation 
to a Supreme Being" and not "essentially political, socio-
logical or philosophical views or a merely personal moral 
code." In Seegar, the Court nevertheless held that the 
quoted language also provided for exemption of one who 
did not entertain any such belief in a Supreme Being. 
Unlike the Constitutional Court of Albania, the United 
States Supreme Court did not dictate an amendment to 
the statute before it, but its transparently manipulative 
interpretation amounted to the same thing. 
Borrowing from Seegar, the Albanian Constitutional 
Court could have accomplished the same ends in Deci-
sion No.8 without so openly usurping legislative power. 
To the first offending sentence, for example, the Court 
might have applied the useful presumption that a legisla-
ture intends to legislate only that which would comply 
with the constitution. Assuming that the presumption 
could not have been rebutted in this instance (by, for 
example, ill-considered if candid declarations during floor 
debate of an intent by the People's Assembly to defy the 
basic law), it could have led the court to conclude that the 
legislature intended to confer on police as extensive a 
power to search for weapons as the constitution would 
suffer. Then the Constitutional Court could have found 
that the Law on Weapons really authorized police 
searches only under the conditions the Court derived 
from Article 2 of the Law on Major Constitutional Provi-
sions. The result would have been a judicial decision 
upholding a legislative act, or at least presenting the ap-
pearance of doing so. 
John Paul Jones is a Prqfossor at the University of Richmond 
Law School The author is indebted to Kathleen Imholz, Esq., of 
Mishkin, Kohler & Imholz in New York for very careful trans-
lations. 
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